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Attacking quantum key distribution with single-photon two-qubit quantum logic
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The Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) probe realizes the most powerful individual attack on Bennett-
Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (BB84 QKD) by means of a single controlled-NOT (CNOT)
gate. This paper describes a complete physical simulation of the FPB-probe attack on polarization-
based BB84 QKD using a deterministic CNOT constructed from single-photon two-qubit quantum
logic. Adding polarization-preserving quantum nondemolition measurements of photon number to
this configuration converts the physical simulation into a true deterministic realization of the FPB
attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Lx, 42.50.Dv, 42.40.Lm
I. INTRODUCTION
Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution
(BB84 QKD) using single-photon polarization states
works as follows [1]. In each time interval allotted for
a bit, Alice transmits a single photon in a randomly se-
lected polarization, chosen from horizontal (H), vertical
(V ), +45◦, or −45◦, while Bob randomly chooses to de-
tect photons in either the H/V or ±45◦ bases. Bob dis-
closes to Alice the sequence of bit intervals and associated
measurement bases for which he has detections. Alice
then informs Bob which detections occurred in bases co-
incident with the ones that she used. These are the sift
events, i.e., bit intervals in which Bob has a detection and
his count has occurred in the same basis that Alice used.
An error event is a sift event in which Bob decodes the
incorrect bit value. Alice and Bob employ a prescribed
set of operations to identify errors in their sifted bits,
correct these errors, and apply sufficient privacy ampli-
fication to deny useful key information to any potential
eavesdropper (Eve). At the end of the full QKD pro-
cedure, Alice and Bob have a shared one-time pad with
which they can communicate in complete security.
In long-distance QKD systems, most of Alice’s pho-
tons will go undetected, owing to propagation loss and
detector inefficiencies. Dark counts and, for atmospheric
QKD systems, background counts can cause error events
in these systems, as can intrusion by Eve. Employing
an attenuated laser source, in lieu of a true single-photon
source, further reduces QKD performance as such sources
are typically run at less than one photon on average per
bit interval, and the occurrence of multi-photon events,
although rare at low average photon number, opens up
additional vulnerability. Security proofs have been pub-
lished for ideal BB84 [2], as have security analyses that
incorporate a variety of non-idealities [3]. Our attention,
however, will be directed toward attacking BB84 QKD,
as to our knowledge no such experiments have been per-
formed, although a variety of potentially practical ap-
∗Electronic address: jhs@mit.edu
proaches have been discussed [4]. Our particular objec-
tive will be to show that current technology permits phys-
ical simulation of the Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) probe
[5], i.e., the most powerful individual attack on single-
photon BB84, and that developments underway in quan-
tum nondemolition (QND) detection may soon turn this
physical simulation into a full implementation of the at-
tack. Thus we believe it is of interest to construct the
physical simulation and put BB84’s security to the test:
how much information can Eve really derive about the
key that Alice and Bob have distilled while keeping Alice
and Bob oblivious to her presence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Sec. II we review the FPB probe and its theoret-
ical performance. In Sec. III we describe a complete
physical simulation of this probe constructed from single-
photon two-qubit (SPTQ) quantum logic. We conclude,
in Sec. IV, by showing how the addition of polarization-
preserving QND measurements of photon number can
convert this physical simulation into a true determinis-
tic realization of the FPB attack on polarization-based
BB84.
II. THE FUCHS-PERES-BRANDT PROBE
In an individual attack on single-photon BB84 QKD,
Eve probes Alice’s photons one at a time. In a collective
attack, Eve’s measurements probe groups of Alice’s pho-
tons. Less is known about collective attacks [6], so we
will limit our consideration to individual attacks. Fuchs
and Peres [7] described the most general way in which
an individual attack could be performed. Eve supplies a
probe photon and lets it interact with Alice’s photon in a
unitary manner. Eve then sends Alice’s photon to Bob,
and performs a probability operator-valued measurement
(POVM) on the probe photon she has retained. Slutsky
et al. [8] demonstrated that the Fuchs-Peres construct—
with the appropriate choice of probe state, interaction,
and measurement—affords Eve the maximum amount of
Re´nyi information about the error-free sifted bits that
Bob receives for a given level of disturbance, i.e., for a
given probability that a sifted bit will be received in er-
2ror. Brandt [5] extended the Slutsky et al. treatment by
showing that the optimal probe could be realized with a
single CNOT gate. Figure 1 shows an abstract diagram of
the resulting Fuchs-Peres-Brandt probe. In what follows
we give a brief review of its structure and performance—
see [5] for a more detailed treatment—where, for simplic-
ity, we assume ideal conditions in which Alice transmits
a single photon per bit interval, there is no propagation
loss and no extraneous (background) light collection, and
both Eve and Bob have unity quantum efficiency pho-
todetectors with no dark counts. These ideal conditions
imply there will not be any errors on sifted bits in the
absence of eavesdropping; the case of more realistic con-
ditions will be discussed briefly in Sec. IV.
Alice Bob
Eve
FIG. 1: (Color online) Block diagram of the Fuchs-Peres-
Brandt probe for attacking BB84 QKD.
In each bit interval Alice transmits, at random, a single
photon in one of the four BB84 polarization states. Eve
uses this photon as the control-qubit input to a CNOT
gate whose computational basis—relative to the BB84
polarization states—is shown in Fig. 2, namely
|0〉 ≡ cos(pi/8)|H〉+ sin(pi/8)|V 〉 (1)
|1〉 ≡ − sin(pi/8)|H〉+ cos(pi/8)|V 〉, (2)
in terms of the H/V basis. Eve supplies her own probe
photon, as the target-qubit input to this CNOT gate, in
the state
|Tin〉 ≡ C|+〉+ S|−〉, (3)
where C =
√
1− 2PE , S =
√
2PE , |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/
√
2,
and 0 ≤ PE ≤ 1/2 will turn out to be the error prob-
ability that Eve’s probe creates on Bob’s sifted bits [9].
So, as PE increases from 0 to 1/2, |Tin〉 goes from |+〉 to
|−〉. The (unnormalized) output states that may occur
for this target qubit are
|T±〉 ≡ C|+〉 ± S√
2
|−〉 (4)
|TE〉 ≡ S√
2
|−〉. (5)
Here is how the FPB probe works. When Alice uses
the H/V basis for her photon transmission, Eve’s CNOT
gate effects the following transformation,
|H〉|Tin〉 −→ |H〉|T−〉+ |V 〉|TE〉 (6)
|V 〉|Tin〉 −→ |V 〉|T+〉+ |H〉|TE〉, (7)
where the kets on the left-hand side denote the Al-
ice⊗Eve state of the control and target qubits at the
|−45◦〉
|1〉
|V 〉
|+45◦〉
|0〉
|H〉
FIG. 2: (Color online) Computational basis for Eve’s CNOT
gate referenced to the BB84 polarization states.
CNOT’s input and the kets on the right-hand side de-
note the Bob⊗Eve state of the control and target qubits
at the CNOT’s output. Similarly, when Alice uses the
±45◦ basis, Eve’s CNOT gate has the following behav-
ior,
|+45◦〉|Tin〉 −→ |+45◦〉|T+〉+ |−45◦〉|TE〉 (8)
|−45◦〉|Tin〉 −→ |−45◦〉|T−〉+ |+45◦〉|TE〉. (9)
Suppose that Bob measures in the basis that Alice has
employed and his outcome matches what Alice sent.
Then Eve can learn their shared bit value, once Bob dis-
closes his measurement basis, by distinguishing between
the |T+〉 and |T−〉 output states for her target qubit. Of
course, this knowledge comes at a cost: Eve has caused
an error event whenever Alice and Bob choose a com-
mon basis and her target qubit’s output state is |TE〉.
To maximize the information she derives from this intru-
sion, Eve applies the minimum error probability receiver
for distinguishing between the single-photon polarization
states |T+〉 and |T−〉. This is a projective measurement
onto the polarization basis {|d+〉, |d−〉}, shown in Fig. 3
and given by
|d+〉 = |+〉+ |−〉√
2
= |0〉 (10)
|d−〉 = |+〉 − |−〉√
2
= |1〉. (11)
|d+〉 = |0〉
|d
−
〉 = |1〉
|T+〉
|T
−
〉
FIG. 3: (Color online) Measurement basis for Eve’s minimum-
error-probability discrimination between |T+〉 and |T−〉.
Two straightforward calculations will now complete
our review of the FPB probe. First, we find the error
probability that is created by Eve’s presence. Suppose
3Alice and Bob use the H/V basis and Alice has sent |H〉.
Alice and Bob will incur an error if the control⊗ target
output from Eve’s CNOT gate is |V 〉|TE〉. The proba-
bility that this occurs is 〈TE |TE〉 = S2/2 = PE . The
same conditional error probability ensues for the other
three error events, e.g., when Alice and Bob use the
±45◦ basis, Alice sends |+45◦〉, and the CNOT output is
|−45◦〉|TE〉. It follows that the unconditional error prob-
ability incurred by Alice and Bob on their sift events is
PE .
Now we shall determine the Re´nyi information that
Eve derives about the sift events for which Alice and
Bob do not suffer errors. Let B = {0, 1} and E = {0, 1}
denote the ensembles of possible bit values that Bob and
Eve receive on a sift event in which Bob’s bit value agrees
with Alice’s. The Re´nyi information (in bits) that Eve
learns about each Alice/Bob error-free sift event is
IR ≡ − log2
(
1∑
b=0
P 2(b)
)
+
1∑
e=0
P (e) log2
(
1∑
b=0
P 2(b | e)
)
, (12)
where {P (b), P (e)} are the prior probabilities for Bob’s
and Eve’s bit values, and P (b | e) is the conditional prob-
ability for Bob’s bit value to be b given that Eve’s is e.
Alice’s bits are equally likely to be 0 or 1, and Eve’s
conditional error probabilities satisfy [10]
P (e = 1 | b = 0) = P (e = 0 | b = 1) (13)
=
1
2
(
1−
√
1− |〈T+|T−〉|
2
〈T+|T+〉〈T−|T−〉
)
(14)
=
1
2
(
1−
√
4PE(1− 2PE)
1− PE
)
. (15)
These results imply that b is also equally likely to be 0
or 1, and that P (b | e) = P (e | b), whence
IR = log2
(
1 +
4PE(1− 2PE)
(1− PE)2
)
, (16)
which we have plotted in Fig. 4.
Figure 4 reveals several noteworthy performance points
for the FPB probe. The IR = 0, PE = 0 point in this
figure corresponds to Eve’s operating her CNOT gate
with |Tin〉 = |+〉 for its target qubit input. It is well
known that such an input is unaffected by and does not
affect the control qubit. Thus Bob suffers no errors but
Eve gets no Re´nyi information. The IR = 1, PE = 1/3
point in this figure corresponds to Eve’s operating her
CNOT gate with |Tin〉 =
√
1/3|+〉 +
√
2/3|−〉, which
leads to |T±〉 ∝ |d±〉. In this case Eve’s Fig. 3 receiver
makes no errors, so she obtains the maximum (1 bit)
Re´nyi information about each of Bob’s error-free bits.
The IR = 0, PE = 1/2 point in this figure corresponds to
Eve’s operating her CNOT gate with |Tin〉 = |−〉, which
0
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Eve’s Re´nyi information about Bob’s
error-free sifted bits as a function of the error probability that
her eavesdropping creates.
gives |T+〉 = |T−〉 = |TE〉 =
√
1/2|−〉. Here it is clear
that Eve gains no information about Bob’s error-free bits,
but his error probability is 1/2 because of the action of
the |−〉 target qubit on the control qubit.
III. PHYSICAL SIMULATION IN SPTQ LOGIC
In single-photon two-qubit quantum logic, each pho-
ton encodes two independently controllable qubits [11].
One of these is the familiar polarization qubit, with ba-
sis {|H〉, |V 〉}. The other we shall term the momentum
qubit—because our physical simulation of the FPB probe
will rely on the polarization-momentum hyperentangled
photon pairs produced by type-II phase matched spon-
taneous parametric downconversion (SPDC)—although
in the collimated configuration in which SPTQ is im-
plemented its basis states are single-photon kets for
right and left beam positions (spatial modes), denoted
{|R〉, |L〉}. Unlike the gates proposed for linear optics
quantum computing [12], which are scalable but non-
deterministic, SPTQ quantum logic is deterministic but
not scalable. Nevertheless, SPTQ quantum logic suffices
for a complete physical simulation of polarization-based
BB84 being attacked with the FPB probe, as we shall
show. Before doing so, however, we need to comment on
the gates that have been demonstrated in SPTQ logic.
It is well known that single qubit rotations and CNOT
gates form a universal set for quantum computation. In
SPTQ quantum logic, polarization-qubit rotations are
easily accomplished with wave plates, just as is done
in linear optics quantum computing. Momentum-qubit
rotations are realized by first performing a SWAP op-
eration, to exchange the polarization and momentum
qubits, then rotating the polarization qubit, and finally
performing another SWAP. The SWAP operation is a
cascade of three CNOTs, as shown in Fig. 5. For its im-
plementation in SPTQ quantum logic the left and right
CNOTs in Fig. 5 are momentum-controlled NOT gates
(M-CNOTs) and the middle CNOT is a polarization-
4controlled NOT gate (P-CNOT). (An M-CNOT uses
the momentum qubit of a single photon to perform the
controlled-NOT operation on the polarization qubit of
that same photon, and vice versa for the P-CNOT gate.)
Experimental demonstrations of deterministic M-CNOT,
P-CNOT, and SWAP gates are reported in [11, 13].
FIG. 5: Quantum circuit diagram for a SWAP gate realized
as a cascade of three CNOTs. In SPTQ quantum logic the
upper rail is the momentum qubit and the lower rail is the
polarization qubit of the same photon.
Figure 6 shows a physical simulation of polarization-
based BB84 under FPB attack when Alice has a single-
photon source and Bob employs active basis selection;
Fig. 7 shows the modification needed to accommodate
Bob’s using passive basis selection. In either case, Alice
uses a polarizing beam splitter and an electro-optic mod-
ulator, as a controllable half-wave plate (HWP), to set
the randomly-selected BB84 polarization state for each
photon she transmits. Moreover, she employs a single
spatial mode, which we assume coincides with the R
beam position in Eve’s apparatus. Eve then begins her
attack by imposing the probe state |Tin〉 on the momen-
tum qubit. She does this by applying a SWAP gate,
to exchange the momentum and polarization qubits of
Alice’s photon, rotating the resulting polarization qubit
(with the HWP in Fig. 6) to the |Tin〉 state, and then
using another SWAP to switch this state into the mo-
mentum qubit. This procedure leaves Alice’s BB84 po-
larization state unaffected, although her photon, which
will ultimately propagate on to Bob, is no longer in a sin-
gle spatial mode. Eve completes the first stage of her at-
tack by sending Alice’s photon through a P-CNOT gate,
which will accomplish the state transformations given in
Eqs. (6)–(9), and then routing it to Bob. If Bob em-
ploys active basis selection (Fig. 6), then in each bit in-
terval he will use an electro-optic modulator—as a con-
trollable HWP—plus a polarizing beam splitter to set
the randomly-selected polarization basis for his measure-
ment. The functioning of this basis-selection setup is
unaffected by Alice’s photon no longer being in a single
spatial mode. The reason that we call Fig. 6 a physical
simulation, rather than a true attack, lies in the measure-
ment box. Here, Eve has invaded Bob’s turf, and inserted
SWAP gates, half-wave plates, polarizing beam splitters,
and additional photodetectors, so that she can forward to
Bob measurement results corresponding to photon count-
ing on the polarization basis that he has selected while
she retains the photon counting results corresponding to
her {|d+〉, |d−〉} measurement. Clearly Bob would never
knowingly permit Eve to intrude into his receiver box in
this manner. Moreover, if Eve could do so, she would not
bother with an FPB probe as she could directly observe
Bob’s bit values.
Single
photon
source
Alice
BB84 setting
one of
four pol. states
pol. state
unchanged
impose
momentum
qubit
SWAP
HWP
SWAP
P-CNOT
Eve
Bob’s pol.
analysis
Joint (Bob and Eve)
measurement
SWAP
SWAP
Bob’s
1
Bob’s
0
FIG. 6: (Color online) Physical simulation of polarization-
based BB84 QKD and the FPB-probe attack.
Bob’spassive
- analysisH V
Joint (Bob and Eve)
measurement
SWAP
SWAP
Bob’s
1
Bob’s
0
50/50
beam splitter
to Bob’s passive
±45° analysis
FIG. 7: (Color online) Modification of Fig. 6 to accommodate
Bob’s using passive basis selection.
If Bob employs passive basis selection (Fig. 7), then he
uses a 50/50 beam splitter followed by static-HWP anal-
ysis in the H-V and ±45◦ bases, with only the former
being explicitly shown in Fig. 7. The rest of Eve’s at-
tack mimics what was seen in Fig. 6, i.e., she gets inside
Bob’s measurement boxes with SWAP gates, half-wave
plates, and additional detectors so that she can perform
her probe measurement while providing Bob with his
BB84 polarization-measurement data. Because the Fig. 7
arrangement requires that twice as many SWAP gates,
twice as many half-wave plates, and twice as many single-
photon detectors be inserted into Bob’s receiver system,
as compared to what is needed in the Fig. 6 setup, we
shall limit the rest of our discussion to the case of active
basis selection as it leads to a more parsimonious phys-
ical simulation of the Fuchs-Peres-Brandt attack. We
recognize, of course, that the decision to use active basis
selection is Bob’s to make, not Eve’s. More importantly,
however, in Sec. IV we will show how the availability
of polarization-preservingQND photon-number measure-
ments can be used to turn Fig. 6 into a true, deterministic
implementation of the FPB attack. The same conversion
can be accomplished for passive basis selection. Before
turning to the true-attack implementation, let us flesh
out some details of the measurement box in Fig. 6 and
show how SPDC can be used, in lieu of the single-photon
source, to perform this physical simulation.
5Let |ψout〉 denote the polarization⊗momentum state
at the output of Eve’s P-CNOT gate in Fig. 6. Bob’s po-
larization analysis box splits this state, according to the
basis he has chosen, so that one basis state goes to the
upper branch of the measurement box while the other
goes to the lower branch of that box. This polariza-
tion sorting does nothing to the momentum qubit, so
the SWAP gates, half-wave plates, and polarizing beam
splitters that Eve has inserted into the measurement box
accomplish her {|d+〉, |d−〉} projective measurement, i.e.,
the horizontal paths into photodetectors in Fig. 6 are pro-
jecting the momentum qubit of |ψout〉 onto |d−〉 and the
vertical paths into photodetectors in Fig. 6 are projecting
this state onto |d+〉. Eve records the combined results of
the two |d+〉 versus |d−〉 detections, whereas Bob, who
only sees the combined photodetections for the upper
and lower branches entering the measurement box, gets
his BB84 polarization data. Bob’s data is impaired, of
course, by the effect of Eve’s P-CNOT.
Single-photon on-demand sources are now under devel-
opment at several institutions [14], and their use in BB84
QKD has been demonstrated [15]. At present, however,
it is much more practical to use SPDC as a heralded
source of single photons [16]. In SPDC, signal and idler
photons are emitted in pairs, thus detection of the signal
photon heralds the presence of the idler photon. More-
over, with appropriate configurations [17], SPDC will
produce photons that are simultaneously entangled in po-
larization and in momentum. This hyperentanglement
leads us to propose the Fig. 8 configuration for physi-
cally simulating the FPB-probe attack on BB84. Here,
a pump laser drives SPDC in a type-II phase matched
χ(2) crystal, such as periodically-poled potassium titanyl
phosphate (PPKTP), producing pairs of orthogonally-
polarized, frequency-degenerate photons that are entan-
gled in both polarization and momentum. The first po-
larizing beam splitter transmits a horizontally-polarized
photon and reflects a vertically-polarized photon while
preserving their momentum entanglement. Eve uses a
SWAP gate and (half-wave plate plus polarizing beam
splitter) polarization rotation so that her photodetector’s
clicking will, by virtue of the momentum entanglement,
herald the setting of the desired |Tin〉 momentum-qubit
state on the horizontally-polarized photon emerging from
the first polarizing beam splitter. Alice’s electronically
controllable half-wave plate sets the BB84 polarization
qubit on this photon, and the rest of the Fig. 8 configu-
ration is identical to that shown and explained in Fig. 6.
Inasmuch as the SPDC source and SPTQ gates needed to
realize the Fig. 8 setup have been demonstrated, we pro-
pose that such an experiment be performed. Simultane-
ous recording of Alice’s polarization choices, Bob’s polar-
ization measurements and Eve’s |d+〉 versus |d−〉 results
can then be processed through the BB84 protocol stack to
study the degree to which the security proofs and eaves-
dropping analyses stand up to experimental scrutiny.
Pump crystal SWAP
SWAP
P-CNOT
SWAP
entangledin pol.
and momentum
momentum
entangled
Eve
BB84
setting
Bob’s
analysis Joint (Bob and Eve)
measurement
FIG. 8: (Color online) Proposed configuration for a complete
physical simulation of the FPB attack on BB84 that is based
on hyperentangled photon pairs from type-II phase matched
SPDC and gates built from SPTQ quantum logic.
IV. THE COMPLETE ATTACK
Although the FPB attack’s physical simulation, as de-
scribed in the preceding section, is both experimentally
feasible and technically informative, any vulnerabilities
it might reveal would only be of academic interest were
there no practical means to turn it into a true deter-
ministic implementation in which Eve did not need to
invade Bob’s receiver. Quantum nondemolition measure-
ment technology provides the key to creating this com-
plete attack. As shown in the appendix, it is possible,
in principle, to use cross-phase modulation between a
strong coherent-state probe beam and an arbitrarily po-
larized signal beam to make a QND measurement of the
signal beam’s total photon number while preserving its
polarization state. Cross-phase modulation QND mea-
surement of photon number has long been a topic of
interest in quantum optics [18], and recent theory has
shown that it provides an excellent new route to pho-
tonic quantum computation [19]. Thus it is not un-
warranted to presume that polarization-preserving QND
measurement of total photon number may be developed.
With such technology in hand, the FPB-probe attack
shown in Fig. 9 becomes viable. Here, Eve imposes a
momentum qubit on Alice’s polarization-encoded pho-
ton and performs a P-CNOT operation exactly as dis-
cussed in conjunction with Figs. 6 and 8. Now, however,
Eve uses a SWAP-gate half-wave plate combination so
that the |d+〉 and |d−〉 momentum qubit states emerg-
ing from her P-CNOT become |V 〉 and |H〉 states en-
tering the polarizing beam splitter that follows the half-
wave plate. This beam splitter routes these polarizations
into its transmitted and reflected output ports, respec-
tively, where, in each arm, Eve employs a SWAP gate, a
polarization-preserving QND measurement of total pho-
ton number, and another SWAP gate. The first of these
SWAPs returns Alice’s BB84 qubit to polarization, so
that a click on Eve’s polarization-preserving QND appa-
ratus completes her {|d+〉, |d−〉} measurement without
further scrambling Alice’s BB84 qubit beyond what has
6already occurred in Eve’s P-CNOT gate. The SWAP
gates that follow the QND boxes then restore definite (V
and H) polarizations to the light in the upper and lower
branches so that they may be recombined on a polarizing
beam splitter. The SWAP gate that follows this recom-
bination then returns the BB84 qubit riding on Alice’s
photon to polarization for transmission to and measure-
ment by Bob. This photon is no longer in the single
spatial mode emitted by Alice’s transmitter, hence Bob
could use spatial-mode discrimination to infer the pres-
ence of Eve, regardless of the PE value she had chosen
to impose. Eve, however, can preclude that possibility.
Because the result of her {|d+〉, |d−〉} measurement tells
her the value of the momentum qubit on the photon be-
ing sent to Bob, she can employ an additional stage of
qubit rotation to restore this momentum qubit to the |R〉
state corresponding to Alice’s transmission. Also, should
Alice try to defeat Eve’s FPB probe by augmenting her
BB84 polarization qubit with a randomly-chosen momen-
tum qubit, Eve can use a QND measurement setup like
that shown in Fig. 9 to collapse the value of that momen-
tum qubit to |R〉 or |L〉, and then rotate that momentum
qubit into the |R〉-state spatial mode before applying the
FPB-probe attack. At the conclusion of her attack, she
can then randomize the momentum qubit on the photon
that will be routed on to Bob without further impact—
beyond that imposed by her P-CNOT gate—on that pho-
ton’s polarization qubit. So, unless Alice and Bob gen-
eralize their polarization-based BB84 protocol to include
cooperative examination of the momentum qubit, Alice’s
randomization of that qubit will neither affect Eve’s FPB
attack, nor provide Alice and Bob with any additional
evidence, beyond that obtained from the occurrence of
errors on sifted bits, of Eve’s presence.
impose
momentum
qubit
SWAP SWAP
HWP
P-CNOT SWAP
SWAP
from
Alice
to
Bob
Eve
Click for
Click for
QNDSWAP SWAP
QNDSWAP SWAP
|d
−
〉
|d+〉
FIG. 9: (Color online) Deterministic FPB-probe attack on
polarization-based BB84 that is realized with polarization-
preserving QND measurements and SPTQ quantum logic.
Some concluding remarks are now in order. We have
shown that a physical simulation of the Fuchs-Peres-
Brandt attack on polarization-based BB84 is feasible
with currently available technology, and we have argued
that the development of polarization-preserving QND
technology for measuring total photon number will per-
mit mounting of a true deterministic FBP-probe attack.
Our analysis has presumed ideal conditions in which Al-
ice employs a single-photon source, there is no propaga-
tion loss and no extraneous (background) light collec-
tion, and both Eve and Bob have unity quantum ef-
ficiency photodetectors with no dark counts. Because
current QKD systems typically employ attenuated laser
sources, and suffer from propagation loss, photodetector
inefficiencies, and extraneous counts, it behooves us to at
least comment on how such non-idealities could impact
the FPB probe we have described.
The use of an attenuated laser source poses no problem
for the configurations shown in Figs. 6–9. This is because
the single-qubit rotations and the CNOT gates of SPTQ
quantum logic effect the same transformations on coher-
ent states as they do on single-photon states. For ex-
ample, the same half-wave plate setting that rotates the
single-photon |H〉 qubit into the single-photon |V 〉 qubit
will transform the horizontally-polarized coherent state
|α〉H into the vertically-polarized coherent state |α〉V .
Likewise, the SPTQ P-CNOT gate that transforms a sin-
gle photon carrying polarization (|H〉 = |0〉, |V 〉 = |1〉)
and momentum (|R〉 = |0〉, |L〉 = |1〉) qubits according
to
cHR|HR〉+ cHL|HL〉+ cV R|V R〉+ cV L|V L〉 −→
cHR|HR〉+ cHL|HL〉+ cV R|V L〉+ cV L|V R〉,(17)
will transform the four-mode coherent-state input with
eigenvalues
[ 〈aˆHR〉 〈aˆHL〉 〈aˆV R〉 〈aˆV L〉 ] =[
αHR αHL αV R αV L
]
, (18)
into a four-mode coherent-state output with eigenvalues
[ 〈aˆHR〉 〈aˆHL〉 〈aˆV R〉 〈aˆV L〉 ] =[
αHR αHL αV L αV R
]
, (19)
where the aˆ’s are annihilation operators for modes la-
beled by their polarization and beam positions. It follows
that the coherent-state PE and IB calculations mimic
the qubit derivations that we presented in Sec. III, with
coherent-state inner products taking the place of qubit-
state inner products. At low average photon number,
these coherent-state results reduce to the qubit expres-
sions for events which give rise to clicks in the photode-
tectors shown in Figs. 6–9.
Finally, a word about propagation loss, detector inef-
ficiencies, and extraneous counts from dark current or
background light is in order. All of these non-idealities
actually help our Eve, in that they lead to a non-zero
quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob in the
absence of the FPB attack. If Eve’s PE value is set be-
low that baseline error rate, then her presence should be
undetectable.
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APPENDIX: QND MEASUREMENT
Here we show that it is possible, in principle, to use
cross-phase modulation between a strong coherent-state
probe beam and an arbitrarily-polarized signal beam to
make a QNDmeasurement of the signal beam’s total pho-
ton number. Let {aˆH , aˆV , aˆP } be the annihilation oper-
ators of the horizontal and vertical polarizations of the
signal beam and the (single-polarization) probe beam,
respectively at the input to a cross-phase modulation in-
teraction. We shall take that interaction to transform
these annihilation operators according to the following
commutator-preserving unitary operation,
aˆH −→ aˆ′H ≡ exp(iκaˆ†P aˆP )aˆH (A.1)
aˆV −→ aˆ′V ≡ exp(iκaˆ†P aˆP )aˆV (A.2)
aˆP −→ aˆ′P ≡ exp[iκ(aˆ†H aˆH + aˆ†V aˆV )]aˆP , (A.3)
where 0 < κ ≪ 1 is the cross-phase modulation cou-
pling coefficient. When the probe beam is in a strong
coherent state, |√NP 〉 with NP ≫ 1/κ2, the total pho-
ton number in the signal beam can be inferred from
a homodyne-detection measurement of the appropriate
probe quadrature. In particular, the state of aˆ′
P
will be
|√NP 〉 when the signal beam’s total photon number is
zero, and its state will be |(1+ iκ)√NP 〉 when the signal
beam’s total photon number is one, where κ≪ 1 has been
employed. Homodyne detection of the aˆ′
P2 ≡ Im(aˆ′P )
quadrature thus yields a classical random-variable out-
come α′
P2 that is Gaussian distributed with mean zero
and variance 1/4, in the absence of a signal-beam photon,
and Gaussian distributed with mean κ
√
NP and vari-
ance 1/4 in the presence of a signal-beam photon. Note
that these conditional distributions are independent of
the polarization state of the signal-beam photon when it
is present. Using the decision rule, “declare signal-beam
photon present if and only if α′
P2 > κ
√
NP /2,” it is easily
shown that the QND error probability is bounded above
by exp(−κ2NP /2)/2≪ 1.
The preceding polarization independent, low error
probability QND detection of the signal beam’s total
photon number does not disturb the polarization state
of that beam. This is so because the probe imposes the
same nonlinear phase shift on both the H and V polar-
izations of the signal beam. Hence, if the signal-beam
input is in the arbitrarily-polarized single-photon state,
|ψS〉 = cH |1〉H |0〉V + cV |0〉H |1〉V , (A.4)
where |cH |2 + |cV |2 = 1, then, except for a physically
unimportant absolute phase, the signal-beam output will
also be in the state |ψS〉.
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